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MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA

REPORT

MADE TO MAJ. GEN. JAMES G. HARBORD, UNITED STATES ARMY, CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION, ON THE MILITARY PROBLEM OF A MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA

By

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PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE

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MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA.

American Military Mission to Armenia,
U. S. S. "Martha Washington,"
Malta, October 19, 1919.

From: Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley.
To: Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, Chief American Military Mission to Armenia.
Subject: The military problem of a mandatory.

When America was confronted with the problem of the recent war, every effort was made to keep us from being involved in it. For two years we kept on friendly terms with the nations which were at war, always with the hope that a settlement would be reached without our becoming involved. The efforts we made to keep out of the war went so far as to involve the criticism by first one power and then another.

On the other hand, when we finally were confronted with a situation which made it our duty to enter the war, we did so on a very broad basis. Plans were made to cover every contingency. The home Government gave loyal support without regard to party lines, and a most carefully selected personnel was placed in charge of all our operations. To the professional soldier it was one of the most surprising features of the war to see our country, in which national defense was largely either neglected or based upon unsound legislation, entirely reverse itself and go to the limit in adopting sound principles for prosecuting the war. This, more than anything else, accounts for the national success we have.

It is my opinion that we must approach the problems of the Near East in the same way. Half measures will certainly end in failure and show us up in a very unfavorable light as administrators before the world. So far we have had only a charitable connection with these problems. Repeatedly we have investigated the problems in the Near East, generally in connection with the sufferings of the Christian population. For years America has been very keenly alive to the sufferings of the Armenians. Singly, and in conjunction with the other powers, America has, at various times, addressed the Porte to institute reforms in the administration of Armenian affairs. America has also given large sums, through its missionary agents in Armenia, through its Red Cross work, and recently in the distribution of food and supplies for the destitute of all races in the Near East. It is certain, however, that little lasting good can be done on a charity basis to guarantee peace and good government in the Near East. The correcting of more than five centuries of misrule in Asia Minor is no small task. The responsibility can not be met by the giving of large sums through missionary societies, generally managed by noble characters with little practical business ability.

All such agencies should be but small incidents in a reorganization built on broad lines looking to good government under which the individual shall be protected in his labor and receive for it a fair profit.

Suggestions will come for the solution of the problem in Asia Minor through the religious organizations which exist there or which might be installed. All such efforts would only lead to more bloodshed in the name of religion and final failure. The opportunity for such a settlement has stood for years at the threshold of first one religion in Asia Minor and then another, but to-day we find the Near East slowly recovering from conditions which were the worst in its history. Those conditions shocked the civilized world at a time when its conscience was somewhat deadened by sights of bloodshed and cruelty incident to the greatest war in history.

IS AMERICA UNDER ANY OBLIGATIONS TO ACCEPT MANDATORY?

America can well claim to be the power that brought forward the covenant of the League of Nations, and that insisted probably, more than any other nation, on the principle that the rights of small nations should be protected and that they should not be used as pawns in the affairs of greater nations. "First and foremost the Allies are fighting for the liberties of small nations, to the end that they be kept in future free from the tyranny of their more powerful neighbors to develop their own national life and institutions."

The peace conference, led by America in this point, actually put this thought into being as far as our problem is concerned, when it prescribed in article 22 of the treaty of peace with Germany that:

> To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.
>
> The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league.
>
> The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
>
> Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

Thus we find that delegates representing Armenia have submitted their claims for independence to the peace conference at Paris:

> After passing through centuries of oppression and sufferings, our nation at the threshold of the twentieth century reached the climax in the universal conflagration, torn and covered with blood, but aspiring with a faith more alive than ever toward its liberation and the realization of its national ideal, thanks to the victory of the allied and associated powers, who have inscribed upon their banners the principles of right, justice, and the right of peoples to dispose of their own lot.

Taking their stand upon these great principles, the Armenian national delegation, interpreting the unanimous voice of the whole nation, a part of which has already constituted itself into an independent Republic in the Caucasus, has already proclaimed the independence of integral Armenia and notified the allied governments thereof by a note of November 30, 1918.

The United States has been pressed to accept the mandate of this country, decimated as it is by massacres, further reduced in manpower by the recent war, its people scattered to the four winds by war and carefully planned deportations, and its character undermined by the worst influences of its near neighbors.

The problems of the Near East are always represented as being extremely complicated. It is true that they are so, but as one travels studying them on the ground he is made to realize at every turn in the road that they have been complicated by the intrigues and ambitions of the powers themselves playing against each other, and the peoples included in the unfortunate area have been largely neglected as their territory has been occupied or abandoned to serve the purposes of the last invader. America has never been a party to any of this. She approaches these problems with clean hands. The peoples involved know she has no imperialistic plans or personal ambitions in the Near East; that she can look at the involved questions in an impartial attitude, and it is for this reason that she is demanded on all sides. When one studies the problems which have brought such suffering to this region, but which could be so efficiently handled by the United States under proper administrators, he can not but be convinced that it is our duty to step in and take over the task, entirely from a disinterested, humanitarian point of view, provided it is given to us by the powers under such conditions that success can reasonably be expected. It will take years to finally settle this problem. The country accepting the mandatory must see to it that from the very outset it is granted that freedom of action which will make possible a final satisfactory solution. Great prestige attaches to the word "America" throughout the Near East to-day. Her officers and officials are trusted by all sides alike. They are even now called upon to listen to the troubles and complaints of peoples in conflict and their decisions are accepted without question. But if we are to become involved in accepting this mandatory, it must be remembered we will be playing on the world's stage. The progress of our administration will be most carefully watched by all and any mistakes will bring forth full criticism, especially by luke-warm friends who in their hearts would gladly see us fail. We must therefore demand our own conditions from the start. There must be no half measures. The sacrifice we will make in taking the task, if we do, involves a similar sacrifice on the part of all nations who must withdraw absolutely from the territory covered by the mandate.

WHERE IS ARMENIA?

But let us try to find this country which the powers would have us govern. Does the Armenian problem now exist, or did the Young Turks actually accomplish their purpose "to rid themselves of the Armenian problem by ridding themselves of the Armenians"?

In the old family Bible the name "Armenia" generally appears for a country south of the Caucasus with its center near Mount Ararat, extending across Asia Minor in the general direction of Alexandretta. We know that the power of the Armenian kings extended for a time to the Mediterranean and to Sivas in the west, which was once the seat of the Armenian kings. The map of Armenia, which their delegates would have us consider, is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, Georgia, and Azarbaijan, and extends in a southeasterly direction to include the cities of Alexandretta and Mersina on the Mediterranean. It is divided into two parts—the northern Caucasian Armenia, made up largely from Russian Armenia, and the second part, Turkish Armenia. Accepting for the moment the figures given by the Armenian delegation, we find the population of this area in 1914 as follows:

	Turkish Armenia.	Caucasian Armenia.	Total.	Religion.
Armenians	1,403,000	1,296,000	2,699,000	3,211,000 Christians.
Greeks, Russians, Nestorians, etc.	447,000	65,000	512,000	
Turks	943,000	61,000	1,005,000	2,308,000 Mussulmen.
Tartars		537,000	537,000	
Kurds and Turkomans	482,000	75,000	556,000	
Lazes, Tcherkess, Arabs, etc.	210,000		210,000	
Kizilbashis, Zazas, Yezidis, etc.	303,000	38,000	341,000	341,000 divers religions.
Total	3,788,000	2,072,000	5,860,000	

The massacres of 1915–16 totaled some 600,000, of whom not less than 500,000 came from within the borders of this new proposed State. Probably an equal number were deported from the same area. To this must be added a large number of Armenians who fought with the Russian armies, with the Foreign Legion and with the British in the Oriental Legion. The percentage of losses among those Armenians who served as soldiers has been very heavy. This would leave an Armenian population of approximately 1,500,000 for the entire new State. Outside this new State, but in regions bordering on Armenia, that is Asiatic Turkey, the Caucasus and Persia, there are probably some 500,000 Armenians. In distant regions, such as Constantinople, Turkey in Europe, Persia, Egypt, and India, there is another 500,000. It is very doubtful if, at the present time, the Armenians are in the majority in the territory proposed for their new State. Certainly they are not so in Turkish Armenia. They claim they should be given credit for Armenians massacred and deported, but this is impracticable. We must take the problem as we find it. It is clear, therefore, that Armenians are spread throughout the Near East. The solution of the problem for their protection involves a large area and includes a control over the countries in which we find them living to-day. Thus we found Armenians throughout Turkey, in Georgia and Azarbiajan. This intermingling of Armenians throughout the Near East makes it impossible to localize the Armenian problem. Furthermore, Turks, Kurds, Tartars, and Georgians and inextricably mixed in the same area, and their rights must be guarded as well. If we should simply enter the area to guard the rights of the Armenians and construct for them a new State we would immediately become involved

with Turks, Kurds, Tartars, and Georgians, and they would fall upon Armenians wherever they could be found. America would lose all its prestige, it would become involved in extensive military operations against all the neighbors of the Armenians, and it would take a strong force to protect such a State organized at such a cost. If foreign protection were later withdrawn, the new State would certainly be set upon by its neighbors and its last condition would be worse than its first.

If, therefore, we are to settle the Armenian question we must have full authority over all the territory in which they now reside, and where unstable governments now exist, namely, Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan. It is as impracticable to try and solve the problem by attempting to assemble all the Armenians in the proposed State as it would be to try to form a German State in America by joining Milwaukee and St. Louis with a view of assembling all the Germans in that area. Besides, many Armenians have taken root where they are. The successful Armenians in such places as Constantinople, Tiflis, and Smyrna have no idea of leaving their well-established homes and assembling in the proposed State.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN TURKEY.

As one investigates the political and military situaton at Constantinople, he is ever conscious of the undercurrent of political activity and intrigue which is already besieging the Sublime Porte. The leaders of each besieging group are rather outspoken in their attacks on the others. The military situation in Turkey is at present largely wrapped up in the Nationalist movement, as we found the Government of the Sultan actually exercising very little authority except in the near vicinity of Constantinople.

The Nationalistic movement started with the occupation of Aden by the British. The Turks feared that similar occupation would be made in Thrace and Armenia. The actual occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks was the occasion for the movement to break out generally. Many public mass meetings were held in Stamboul. Protests were made to the occupation of Smyrna. The fundamental purpose of the movement was for the rights of Moslems and for the integrity of Turkey as outlined by the armistice. Turks were appealed to to shed their last drop of blood before allowing their country to be partitioned.

Coincident with these mass meetings the reserve Turkish officers held large meetings and formed a union with the students in Stamboul and with the society called the National Block for the purpose of protecting the "national rights." Special sections were organized for work in propaganda (including women agents), financing, and also for military, this latter naturally being entrusted to the officers. Large numbers of reserve officers then began to leave Constantinople for all parts of the interior. Those going toward Smyrna helped in the organization and fighting against the Greeks. The others proceeded openly throughout Anatolia with the organization for the defense of the "national rights." At the same time Moustapha Kemal Pasha, who had gone to Erzerum and there had refused to obey governmental orders for his recall to Constantinople,

took up reins of the movement and declared his intention of breaking off relations with the Government, if necessary, to secure the rights of Moslems. On July 10 he convened the "congress of Erzerum," which after various fiery sessions threatening bloodshed on all sides, issued a set of resolutions very much modified but insisting on an undivided Turkey for the Turks.

Up to this date, the Turkish Government at Constantinople insisted that the movement was only local and of little importance. In various well-informed circles in Constantinople, including British, French, Turkish, and Armenian sources, the belief existed that the whole movement was actually backed by the Government. Early in August, it was believed by some that although it had first been backed by the Government, the movement had gotten out of hand. However, despite this supposition, an official of the ministry of the interior declared on September 4 that the ministry was sending 800,000 Turkish pounds (paper) to the Fifteenth Army Corps with headquarters at Erzerum to carry on its work and for propaganda amongst Kurds and Tartars.

Our investigations, however, at Sivas, which had since become the headquarters of the Nationalist movement, did not confirm this. We found that regular funds had been received for the support of the Fifteenth Corps. On the other hand, we found that the leaders of the Nationalist movement had severed all official communication with Stamboul. Army officers generally in the Fifteenth Corps seemed to be taking their orders from the leaders of the Nationalist movement at Sivas.

About the 1st of August, Moustapha Kemel Pasha made a final break with the British authorities at Erzerum by absolutely refusing to hand over munitions stored in his district to the British according to the terms of the armistice. Col. Rawlinson, head of the British mission at Erzerum, reported this fact to the British authorities at Constantinople and was then ordered by them to leave Erzerum and go to Kars.

Early in August, Moustapha Kemal Pasha issued a call for a second congress to be convened at Sivas about August 20. However, due to the late arrival of the various representatives, the congress did not convene until about September 1, and continued in session until September 10 when it was dissolved after promulgating a new series of resolutions based largely upon those of Erzerum. These resolutions included (I) a stand for the integrity of the Turkish Empire as outlined by the terms of the armistice, October 30, 1918; (II) national independence and the continuance of the Sultan both as head of the State and as supreme caliph; (III) opposition to the formation, at the expense of the mother country, of an independent Armenia or independent parts of Greece; (IV) discontinuance of privileges to non-Musselmen; (V) to take all methods and means to safeguard the Sultan and the supreme caliph, and the integrity of the country in the case Turkey, under foreign pressure, should be called upon to give up a part of her territory; (VI) to await decision for the integrity of the country; (VII) to accept assistance in connection with scientific, industrial, and economic needs, provided the integrity of the Empire was assured; (VIII) the calling of a Nationalist assembly to take action to safeguard the nation; (IX) the

recognition of "the assembly to defend the rights and the interests of the Provinces of Anatolia and Roumelia;" (X) to prosecute the Nationalist movement in small and large centers.

During this last session the congress made a complete break with the cabinet at Constantinople, declaring that its policy was disloyal to the Turks and prompted apparently by selfish motives. This berak was hastened by a so-called plot of the British and Turkish minister of the interior to organize a force of Kurds with the aid of the Vali of Kharput to come to Sivas and disperse the congress and arrest the leaders. The British and French Governments were denounced in particular for their attitude toward Turkey in the occupation of Cilicia and the aid in the Greek occupation of Smyrna.

It is only natural that the Turk should entertain a very bitter feeling against any nationals included within the Turkish Empire who wish to organize a separate state, with a view of having it cut off from Turkey. This largely explains the Turks' attitude toward the Armenians and Greeks. The Nationalist movement is without doubt patriotic. Many of its active leaders are men of high repute. These leaders seem to come from all parties.

A noted example of the better class of Turk is represented in Bekir Sami Bey, who has held various governmental positions, and outside of monetary affairs has a very fine reputation. At the time of the Armenian deportations in 1915 he was Vali of Aleppo and after protesting against these deportations without success, he resigned his position rather than carry them out. When questioned by a close friend as to why he had joined this movement he said that it was the only way to retain an unidivided Turkey. All these leaders have worked with every means to arouse the local population. In all the talk of the leaders there is much said about fighting to the last drop of blood before they would see the partition of Turkey, and that Smyrna must be returned to them, an independent Armenia must not be permitted, and a foreign power not placed over them.

As far as can be learned, the brains of the movement are centered in Constantinople, having at its head Ahmed Riza Bey, founder of the political party of National Block, and in Halide Hanoun, a woman of marked talent and high education, with a thorough knowledge of English. Her oratorical power is great, and during the mass meetings at Stamboul, in her public speeches, she moved many Turks to tears by her appeal to flock to the standard for the country's defense. During the régime of the Young Turks she was prominent in their circles and a close friend of Djemal Pasha, commander of the army in the Egyptian campaign, and who is now in flight with Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha. Halide Hanoun is also the leader of the propaganda work in Constantinople and has a strong organization with her.

In regard to the question of a mandate, the idea of the Nationalist Party seems to be to accept scientific, industrial, and economic assistance only. Their sovereignty and independence must not be interfered with. In conference with Moustapha Kemal Pasha and his principal assistants, he stated it was necessary for his party to insist upon such conditions. Nothing less would have been acceptable to the congress. He pointed out the experience Turkey had had in the past, when first one foreign Government and then

another had endeavored to run her affairs. He said he could add that there would be no difficulty in the event America was the Nation to be given the mandatory. All necessary powers would be granted to such a mandatory, but such a statement would not have been acceptable to the congress as a general proposition.

It is my opinion that Moustapha Kemal Pasha and his party stand for a united Islamic Empire. Raouf Bey practically stated this. There is nothing in their platform covering the Christian population and the measures to be taken to protect their rights. On the contrary, they specially mention the withdrawing of all special privileges from non-Moslems.

Moustapha Kemal Pasha and his assistants, Raouf Bey and Rustin Bey, are a dangerous lot. The first two are strong characters, the last a weak one. All three will probably go to any length to ingratiate themselves with the Turkish people and with foreign investigators, but if they were given power I believe they would abuse it, and that all three would become unscrupulous administrators.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

As a result of the armistice the Turkish Army has been demobilized to approximately 43,000 officers and men.

Fifteenth Corps, headquarters at Erzerum	13,780
Third Corps (headquarters not given)	4,680
Thirteenth Corps, headquarters at Diarbekir	4,920
Twentieth Corps, headquarters at Angora	1,632
Twelfth Corps, headquarters at Konia	2,948
Seventeenth Corps, headquarters at Smyrna	5,704
Fifteenth Corps, headquarters at Rodosto	2,857
Twenty-fifth Corps, headquarters at Constantinople	3,948
First Corps, headquarters at Adrianople	2,737
Total	43,296

The distribution of this force as first demobilized is shown in Appendix A (not printed). From the moment demobilization was ordered there have been a great many desertions. Some organizations were practically disbanded, and I believe the army is even below the strength stated. It will be seen that of a total of 43,000, approximately 13,000 are in the Fifteenth Corps, which is covering the Turkish-Armenian frontier. This strength was verified at the frontier with the result that the grand total of the Fifteenth Corps was found to be 13,020.

Since the publication of the map (Apendix A) there have been some changes in the organization and disposition of the Fifteenth Corps. The actual disposition at the time of our inspection, September 25-26, was as follows:

The Turkish Army is not localized in its organization and its recent demobilization has a very important bearing on a number of problems affecting Turkey to-day. Many of the Turkish soldiers were turned adrift without money or supplies. In these cases often only two ways were open to them. First, they could get to their homes the best they could. In the event they attempted this, it was often necessary for them to live off the country. In doing so they robbed the local communities. But many are reported to have joined local bands and preyed upon the country. As stated above,

many have assembled in the regions east of Smyrna and are opposing the Greek advance.

The Turkish Army presents to-day a very sad spectacle. The organizations we inspected generally lacked clothing and equipment. Both officers and men were very irregularly and poorly supplied and paid. Many units out of touch with Constantinople have to maintain themselves by local requisitions. The commissioned personnel are discouraged and demobilized soldiers are met everywhere on the highways. Practically all of them were armed either with the Russian or Turkish military rifle. Much of the equipment in the hands of troops was not properly turned in on demobilization. Lieut. Col. Kenan Bey, commanding the Fifth Division, told me that in the Province of Diarbekir alone there were some 70,000 rifles in the hands of the people. The demobilized divisions generally have a strength of less than 2,000 and are commanded by a lieutenant colonel or colonel. Corps are commanded by colonels or brigadier generals. As to the future of this force, the older officers might well be pensioned off. The desirable part could then be absorbed in a military establishment organized on a constabulary basis under foreign command and control. The Turks have been soldiers for centuries. They are courageous and good fighters, especially when their fanaticism is aroused. Ignorant and enduring, the Turk resigns himself to discipline. Lacking in intelligence and initiative his value as a soldier largely depends upon his officers.

The fighting qualities of the Tartars are about the same as those of the Turk.

Only since 1908 have the Kurds been required to serve in the Turkish Army. Previous to this they had their Hamidijih regiments. They are good horsemen and courageous fighters. They have lived the life of brigands and highwaymen. As soldiers they would be easily handled and disciplined. In many ways they would appeal to the American, and the problem of handling them would be interesting.

THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN FRONTIER.

At the time of our leaving Paris we were informed by the Armenian delegation that the Turks under the leadership of Moustapha Kemal Pasha were making extensive preparations to attack Armenia from across the borders; that Moustapha Kemal Pasha had distributed 60,000 rifles with ammunition and grenades to the Turkish civilian population in the vicinity of Erzerum and had organized divisions and bands. It was stated that one purpose of this movement was to prevent the return of Armenians to their homes. Although I would not trust Moustapha Kemal Pasha, we saw nothing to confirm this Paris report. The Fifteenth Corps deployed covering the Black Sea, and the Armenian frontiers, and Persia had not been increased in strength. No evidence of any crossing of the frontier by organizations of the Turkish regular army was found. The frontier was inspected from both the Turkish and Armenian sides. Our Armenian informant in Paris had stated that the attack by Azarbaijan was being organized by demobilized Turkish officers and soldiers who had crossed the frontier and accepted service with the Azarbaijan forces.

They pointed out particularly Khalil Bey. I found this officer at Nakhichevan. He had taken part in the operations between Tartars strength. No evidence of any crossing of the frontier by organizations. Although I inspected the Tartar area in the region of Nakhichevan for 80 miles, I saw no evidence of Turks other than Khalil Bey. This officer has a bad face, with all the earmarks of a bad character. The Turkish outposts had strict orders not to cross the frontier for any reason. They were authorized to allow Armenians to cross the border in entering Turkey, provided they could show they were former Turkish Armenians, as the Turks state they do not want any Russian Armenians, whom they claim have Bolshevist tendencies.

The strip of territory just north of the frontier in Armenia, between Kaghizman and Kulp, is infested with Kurds and Tartars. The Armenians do not control it and we found great difficulty in getting through. The party was attacked by both Tartars and Kurds, part of our personnel being held captive over one night. In no case have the Armenians shown ability to administer territory included within their boundaries and occupied by Tartars, Kurds, or Georgians; that is, they have not been able to keep the peace, and their administration has not been satisfactory to the inhabitants except when these inhabitants are Armenians.

THE GENDARMERIE.

The organization of the gendarmerie in Turkey is by regiments, battalions, and companies, all on a very elastic basis, permitting the organization to be adjusted to the particular area to which it is assigned. For this purpose the regiment may vary greatly in strength. One regiment is assigned to a vilayet and it has a battalion for each sandjak, which in turn has a company for each caza. The regiment is simply an administrative unit. Before the war several regiments or independent battalions constituted one inspection district under a colonel. The colonel inspected the organization, made changes in stations of units, and studied question of personnel. Taking a concrete example in the vilayet of Sivas, we find one regiment assigned to the whole area for administrative purposes. One battalion is assigned to each of the sandjaks Amassia, Tokat, and Karahissar, with one battalion at Sivas. This gives the regiment four battalions. The number of companies in these battalions varies from four to nine, depending upon the number of cazas to be covered. The strength of the companies varies from 80 to 120 men. They are subdivided so as to meet the local situation. In Sivas it was reported that the pay was only 15 paper pounds per month for married men and 10 paper pounds for unmarried men. At Adana I found that the dismounted gendarme received 14.50 paper pounds per month, while the mounted gendarme received 19.50. The officers and noncommissioned officers are of poor quality. As a rule the best material they had before the war was absorbed in the regular army. A large percentage of these soldiers never returned. The loss of man power in Turkey as a result of the war, disease, and interracial conflicts, has been appalling. The present approximate total strength of the Turkish gendarmerie is 30,000. A more complete report on this subject appears in Appendix B.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

One approaches Asia Minor with the impression that it is a country of most limited means of communication, and that large parts of it are impassable. This impression is reinforced at Constantinople after interviews with "experts" on Asia Minor affairs, some of whom have seldom crossed the Bosporus. To the American who has had experience in the field in Arizona, Texas, and Mexico, Asia Minor presents no great difficulties. Motor transportation has also greatly simplified the problem. The problem is further simplified due to the fact that the area we are considering is surrounded by ocean highways upon which numerous bases are available. From these bases existing railways assure primary distribution, while secondary distribution can be made by road or trail. The roads vary from good to very poor. Generally, excellent road material exists on the spot. Pack transportation, however, can go almost anywhere. Much of the soil is gumbo similar to that found in parts of Texas. In dry weather motor transportation or wagon transportation can go over the country in almost any direction except where the mountains or gullies make the way impassable. In these regions off the railway, transportation of material and supplies would have to be made during the dry season. Actual communication could be maintained, however, even during the wet season by pack transportation.

Derinje, near Scutari, and Smyrna are excellent bases for western Anatolia. From these points primary distribution can be made over a large area. The region in the vicinity of Sivas can be reached by an excellent military road from Ulakishla, or from the Black Sea port of Samsun. Trebizond, also on the Black Sea, could supply Erzerum and vicinity, but this is over a military road with bad grades, which makes transportation very slow and extremely costly. A base at Mersina could meet the needs of Cilicia. It was being used by the British when we inspected it. It reminds one of a small Spanish port situated on an open roadstead. The British are using one pier and handle in and out an average of 1,700 tons per week. There is a second pier capable of handling about one-half of this amount. This 1,700 tons includes receipts and about equal shipments of grain to Egypt. A branch of the main line runs to the pier used by the British. With improved facilities on additional piers the amount of freight which could be handled at this port could be greatly increased, but it is not a good commercial proposition. The commander of the port and his subordinates at the dock informed us that often they could not unload during three or four days out of the week on account of the sea. Poor as this dock is, it affords ample facilities for the supply of the British forces approximating an aggregate of 20,000 officers and men stationed in Cilicia and as far down the main line as Aleppo.

Aghalaman Bay, 64 miles west of Mersina, is reported as an excellent protected bay, equally available. We talked with the British officer who had just made a survey of this bay. He reports it as excellent, and that docking facilities could be made with small outlay of funds. From a study of the terrain, it looks as if it would be difficult to extend the branch line to this bay. This project should

be carefully studied, as Alexandretta is reported no better than Mersina and by some not as good. We had no opportunity to inspect Alexandretta ourselves.

All the railways are equipped with telegraph. Telegraph lines also run along all the principal Government highways, so that the headquarters of each Vilayet and most principal towns are connected up by telegraph or telephone. The military roads have often been wonderfully laid out and constructed on a first-class basis throughout, including fine stone bridges and culverts, but they are fast going to pieces. Only in very rare instances did we see any work being done on them. When one reaches the Transcaucasus he realizes that the three so-called republics are established on foundations well built by the Russians and that their Governments are now equipped with the plunder left by the Russian Government and its army when they withdrew. So it is in Turkey. The Turk has constructed little himself. On the contrary, he allows whatever is turned over to him to go to pieces, to deteriorate and decay. The Turks in Constantinople are simply camping on the remains of a once famous and well-built city whose remains are now shown to the visitor generally surrounded or surmounted by shacks and hovels with their filthy inmates.

THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.

The discussion of this subject forms no part of this report only in so far that it is important to point out that the present subdivision of Turkey into Vilayets would greatly facilitate control by a military government. For the normal Vilayet 10 officers should be provided. A military governor with one assistant, a commanding officer of the constabulary with two assistants (the constabulary to be a force absorbing the best parts of the army and gendarmerie), a provost marshal, a provost judge, a sanitary inspector with two assistants, a total of seven line officers and three officers of the medical department. There are 15 Vilayets included in the Turkish Empire as outlined by the armistice. There is an equal number of sandjaks. Approximately 300 officers would therefore be needed for administrative purposes in Turkish Provinces. In some instances an excellent civilian governor might be found in office whom we would not displace. In other places, as local conditions improved, civil governors of suitable character could be found and installed thus freeing American officers for other duty, but at the outset we should figure on having sufficient American officers available for all these positions. The navy and army required will be discussed after the situation in each subdivision of the proposed mandate has been considered.

TURKEY IN EUROPE, ANATOLIA AND THE TRANSCAUCASUS.

Before proceeding to take up the Transcaucasus, it is most important to consider strategically the three great subdivisions of the area alone and in connection with each other. It is also important to consider what is to become of these areas when the mandatory

withdraws. The area under consideration groups itself into three distinct areas, Turkey in Europe, Anatolia, and the Transcaucasus.

In the past Constantinople has generally been the goal for the campaigns which have so disturbed the Balkans. This was due to the conflict of the powers in their efforts to reach Constantinople by controlling an overland route to that city through the Balkans. The Balkan States were molded and remolded to make such a plan possible for first one power and then another. One of the most important tasks of the League of Nations will be to see to it that no such juggling is permitted in future. This can be made easier if we remove Turkey in Europe from the grab bag by first turning it over to a mandatory and then by internationalizing it. Or the territory of Turkey in Europe, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles inclusive, could be then organized into an autonomous state with its neutrality fully guaranteed by the powers. Now is the opportune time to move Turkey out of Europe. The trek of the Turk has already started eastward and such a policy would stimulate it. Constantinople will ever remain a polyglot city at a most important road crossing.

It can truly be said that practically all European wars begin and end in the Near East. This war has been no exception, and by removing the tempting price of Constantinople from all the peace of the world will be so much more assured. It will be many years before Anatolia will cease to need a mandatory or a directorate. The estimate that was made of Turkey by the peace conference and published to the world in June is only too true. Unfortunately some of the powers who helped frame the note are largely responsible for the conditions which they so well describe.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ARMENIA.

Strategically Armenia is in a very serious situation. The only railway entering it passes through Georgian territory. This is practically the only means for bringing supplies into Armenia. It is always with the greatest difficulty that these shipments are arranged. The base port, Batum, is in territory hostile to Armenia and Armenians. In addition to having such a perilous line of communications, Armenia itself is surrounded by enemies and she is now involved in almost 360° of border troubles.

In December, 1918, border warfare broke out between Armenia and Georgia over the district of Borchalo and Akhalkalaki. The Borchalo district is inhabited by Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and Greeks, the Armenians claiming the majority. The situation is further complicated by the presence in the district of valuable Aliverdi copper mines controlled by a French company. Georgia claimed that the region was the gateway to Tiflis and she therefore had added claims to it for strategic reasons. Akhalkalaki is reported as being strongly Armenian, but is claimed by Georgia for historic reasons. The conflict was soon stopped by the British, who declared Borchalo a neutral zone, placing a British governor in charge. The presence of this one British officer has been sufficient to guarantee the neutrality of the area. The Akhalkalaki district passed to Georgia and is now incorporated in that State.

The anti-Armenian feeling in Georgia was again aroused by the refusal of Armenia to join Georgia and Azarbaijan in a defensive league against Denikin.

The districts of Ardahan and Olti are both overwhelmingly Mohammedan. Although the Armenian frontier included both these districts, she was never able to exercise her control over them. At present, Ardahan district is under local Tartar control, while Olti district is under local Kurd control.

The province of Kars had been organized by the Turks immediately after the armistice into the southwestern Republic of Kars, and as such it prevented the repatriation of Armenians until the latter part of April, 1919. This province is composed of the districts of Kars, Kagizman, Ardahan, and Olti. Pre-war figures show the population of the province to be Mohammedans 54,000, Armenians 42,000, and other nationals 21,000; Kagizman with 22,000 Mohammedans, 21,000 Armenians, and 2,000 other nationals. The province was occupied by the Armenians and British in the latter part of April, 1919, and the Armenians repatriated to a large extent. In July and August insurrections broke out in connection with the Tartar outbreaks in Nakhichevan. The trouble is not yet settled. The Armenians do not control the district extending from Kagizman to Kulp. This is controlled by roving bands of Tartars and Kurds. Border warfare here may be expected at any time.

The most serious border situation is in the direction of Nakhichevan. Here a serious outbreak of the Tartars took place in the latter part of June. The trouble is still going on. The Tartar outposts stand only 30 versts from Erivan. This district is predominantly Tartar and had been occupied by the British and Armenians in the latter part of April, after the dissolution of the local Tartar government by the British. The British troops were withdrawn about the middle of May. As a hotbed of Mohammedanism and under agitation of Turkish agitators, chief of whom is Col. Khalil Bey, the revolution gained force, and in July Tartar troops advanced to within 20 versts of Erivan.

In conference at Nakhichevan, at which was present the governor, Samid Bei Jamlinski, Col. Khalil Bey (an ex-Turkish officer), Col. Kalbalai Kan, Capt. Villaret, and the undersigned, the following points were given us as a basis upon which the Tartars asked for settlement: They claim that bloodshed started due to Armenian misgovernment. They ask that a committee investigate the situation for the information of the outside world. They were pleased to have their case investigated by the Harboard mission. They point out that in the district there were 90 per cent Tartars and 10 per cent Armenians. In view of this fact, they do not understand why it was that an Armenian Government had been placed over them. They claim that Mussulmen in Armenia are badly treated and that they are treating Armenians fairly. They consider themselves united with the Azarbaijan Government because of religion, language, and customs. They claim that the Armenians brought this distress in the region and that they are doing all in their power to relieve it by aiding both the Tartar and Armenian refugees. They suggest an exchange of prisoners to prevent suffering. They state they would not submit even if Azarbaijan gives up the territory. They ask that a certain American missionary, who, they say, mixed up in political questions, be withdrawn. This problem is in process

of solution, as it is proposed to proclaim the area a neutral zone under an American governor. This will settle the question only temporarily.

Col. Kalbalai Kan stated that he thought it was necessary to have all the Caucasian States under one power so that questions of boundary lines would not be so critical. This is a sound suggestion and the Transcaucasian region must be an integral subdivision of the mandate. The northern boundary can be fixed with Denikin, the Turks are satisfied with the 1878 frontier. All interior boundaries should largely disappear for the time being.

Zangazeur and Karabagh, separated from Erivan on the one side by a difficult mountain range and on the other by the Tartars of Nakhichevan, presents a serious problem for the Armenians. The mountain section of Zangazeur and Karabagh is strongly Armenian and their people have retained much of their independence throughout the centuries of oppression in other regions. The Armenians in this region are all mountaineers and are in every way a fine type. These regions have produced excellent soldiers.

Upon the arrival of the British in the Caucasus the two districts were in dispute by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The British declared the two districts neutral and then appointed Dr. Sultanoff governor. To this all Armenians objected, and they refused to acknowledge the authority of Dr. Sultanoff, saying that inasmuch as the district was neutral a neutral governor should be appointed and not a nominee of either the Azarbaijan or Armenian Governments. Dr. Sultanoff was placed in power at Shousha by the British, but his authority did not penetrate far into the mountain districts. A British regiment, which was located in the valley from Evlak to Shousha, was largely withdrawn in late May. Following this occurred the massacres at Shousha, on June 4 and 5, when 620 Armenians were killed and a number of Armenian villages destroyed. About three British officers and 20 enlisted men were in the city at the time, and about 150 in the vicinity. Fighting broke out between Armenians and Tartars. Sultanoff was taken to Baku for investigation, but was again installed as governor of the districts about the last of July. Fighting to some extent continued in August. Since then fighting has ceased and Karabagh has agreed to acknowledge Azarbaijan until the peace conference settles its destiny, and in the meantime is to have autonomy.

Zangazeur has not acknowledged the authority of the Tartars, but the situation is quiet at present. There is immediate danger of operations in the region by Azarbaijan forces and resistance by the Armenian population. The Azarbaijan government wants an all-Moslem route for the railway which is being built from Baku to Djulfa. In the meantime the plan is probably to well-Tartarize all the districts through which the railway passes. They can not entirely Tartarize the line to Batum, but Armenia would be powerless to stop the shipment of troops through her territory.

THE ARMENIAN ARMY.

The war minister is head of the entire military establishment. He is responsible only to the council of ministers and to the Parliament. There is a commanding general who is subordinate to the war minister.

The army is composed of regulars, volunteers, and militia.

At the base of the army are the regular troops, composed of (*a*) three separate brigades of two regiments each. With each brigade a separate division of artillery of two battalions each; (*b*) one separate mounted brigade of two mounted regiments of three squadrons in each regiment; (*c*) three separate sentry battalions for the purpose of local garrison service; (*d*) engineers and technician troops composed of one battalion of engineers, one division of wireless telegraphy, one section of motor cars, two armored trains, and the separate aviation detachment.

The volunteer units are formed as a temporary measure to attract the refugees into the military service. The following units composed of volunteers are counted in the number of units of the army: (*a*) Separate volunteer brigades of two regiments; (*b*) three separate volunteer battalions; and (*c*) two separate volunteer mounted divisions. Finally, in order to guard the frontiers, in several regions, out of the local inhabitants not due to military service, are formed several units on the principle of militia. They are as follows: (*a*) Separate brigade of military composed of two regiments; (*b*) separate battalion of militia.

The distribution of the troops: To simplify the administration of the troops, all military units are divided into two groups: (*a*) Erivan and (*b*) Alexandropol groups. The Erivan group, composed of one infantry brigade, one brigade of militia and one volunteer brigade, is disposed in the regions Igdir, Novobaiazet, Kamarlu, Erivan, and Nakhichevan. The Alexandropol group, composed of two infantry brigades, one mounted brigade, the aviation detachment, and the battalion of engineers, is disposed in the regions Kars, Sarikamish, Alexandropol, Delidjan, and Karakliss.

The total ration strength of the regular establishment is 21,459, with a total of 13,570 bayonets. The detailed strength by units, with statement of material on hand, terms of service for officers and men, is given in Appendix C. A statement showing who is required to serve in the Armenian army appears in Appendix D.

The Russian Armenians have been subject to military service in the Russian Army, in which they have furnished many leaders. They compare very favorably with the best Russian soldier of the prewar imperial army. The Turkish Armenians were not subject to military service until after 1908. They fought well in the Turkish Army in 1912. They showed skill and courage on the Caucasian front in 1914–1917. The Armenian is intelligent and patriotic. When well led and equipped, he compares favorably with the best. At present they are greatly in need of equipment, munitions, and clothing. In their present position, even when they can finance a purchase of military stores, they have great difficulty in getting Georgia to let the shipments pass.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN GEORGIA.

Although Georgia occupies a strategic position in regard to Armenia, controlling as it does the line of communication upon which Armenia's life depends, Georgia has many very serious troubles of its own. It has border troubles with Denikin on the

north. Azarbaijan wants territory which comes very close to Tiflis. I have already outlined her border troubles with Armenia. The port upon which she depends, Batum, is in the Moslem district by the same name. Remembering the critical strategic setting of Armenia, one might write the proportion, Georgia is to Armenia as Batum is to Georgia.

Georgia's troubles with Denikin resulted from her joining hands with Denikin in 1918 in clearing up the Black Sea province. It is reported that the Georgian troops looted and robbed this rich area. Denikin sent them back. Technically a state of war existed between them. The Georgians withdrew to the line of the River Bzyb. Denikin's forces held the line of the Mekhadir just north. British troops patrolled between the two and prevented conflict. The Georgians claimed their frontier should be along the Mekhadir for strategic reasons. On the Mekhadir the mountains come very close to the sea, leaving only a short river line to defend. On the Bzyb the mountains are quite a distance from the sea, leaving a considerable river line to defend.

In May, 1919, the Georgians advanced and occupied the river Mekhadir, which they now hold. In advancing they looted Gagri which is situated on the coast. Denikin is reported to have said that he will have no further dealings with the Georgians until they withdraw south of the Bzyb.

The Province of Batum is claimed by Georgia. Strategically Georgia certainly needs it if Georgia is to remain an independent State. Batum is now occupied by British troops, three battalions. If the British should withdraw from Batum before being relieved by allied troops, what would happen? Georgia would attempt to grab Batum Province. The people of Batum are mostly Moslem and they would rebel. They are a wild lot of brigands. They could, in a very short time, so destroy the railway as to entirely disorganize the whole Transcaucasian territory.

The Georgian Government is not stable; neither are the Georgians. They are spectacular, have a showy brigandish sort of manner. It seems like a Punch and Judy show to see them playing with self-government.

THE GEORGIAN ARMY.

The strength and disposition is as follows:

Total strength, 1,100 sabers, 11,000 rifles, 54 guns; national guard, 10,000 rifles, 16 guns.

Gagri front, 200 sabers, 1,500 rifles, 12 guns; 800 rifles of national guard.

Dushet-Kazbek area, 500 rifles, 2 guns.

Tiflis, 500 sabers, 2,300 rifles, 20 guns; 1,200 rifles of national guard.

Ozourgeti and Notanebi, 200 sabers, 1,500 rifles, 8 guns; 800 rifles of national guard.

Akhaltsikh area, 200 sabers, 1,400 rifles, 8 guns; 800 rifles of national guard.

Borchalinsk area (Batum Province), 300 rifles, 2 guns.

The Georgians have been subject to military service in the Russian Army and they have furnished generals in that army. They

are more intelligent than the Tartars, but less so than the Armenians. They appear showy on parade, but their history does not show them dependable in battle. Recently they have shown some socialistic tendencies. A statement made by the minister of war of Georgia on the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia appears in Appendix E.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN AZARBAIJAN.

Like Armenia, Azarbaijan is dependent upon Georgia for her line of communications. At present the relations between Azarbaijan and Georgia are friendly, so Azarbaijan has no trouble in getting its supplies through on the railway. These two countries have a defensive alliance against Denikin. They are also drawn together in having a mutual contempt for Armenia. The all around strategical situation of Georgia, beginning at the north, is as follows:

Georgia is very much afraid of Denikin on the north and wants Daghestan as a neutral area to protect them on that frontier. The conditions in Karabagh, Zangezeur, and Nakhichevan have been considered under Armenia. Azarbaijan claims more territory toward Tiflis as being Tartar in majority. Georgia largely controls her commercial and supply situation by controlling the railway. But Azarbaijan generally controls the oil which is used throughout the railway.

The most important situation is that of Daghestan in its connection with Denikin. The natural dividing line between Daghestan and Azarbaijan is the Samour Chay. The people of Daghestan are made up of a great many tribes. Communications have been always very poor and often these tribes do not understand each other. Culture is not high. Religion is fanatical and Moslem. The coast language of the Kalmyks is the most general common language. These people love their freedom and are willing to fight for it. It took the Russians 60 years to conquer them. When conquered they are reported to have carried out the Russian conditions honestly. The Russians report them savages but honest. The Russians ruled by means of officers, many of whom were dishonest and all of whom were ignorant of local conditions. The curse of the Transcaucasus seems to have been the low character of the Russian officials. Numerous rebellions resulted which were put down one after another by Russian troops.

After the Russian revolution broke out, there was formed a union of the "Peoples of the Mountains." This was an alliance of the north Caucasus Mountain tribes. Denikin in his first advance toward Baku took all before him until he reached Daghestan. Daghestan and Azarbaijan appealed to the British, who halted Denikin on the frontier of Daghestan. Denikin said he would not cross this border. About this time there was organized in Daghestan a new party called the Old Officer Party, with Gen. Halilof at its head. Not long thereafter Denikin advanced without opposition to the Azarbaijan frontier. This was permitted by the Old Officer Party, whose leader, Halilof, it is stated, was bought off. On the other hand, this Old Officer Party probably saw hope for advancement of themselves and their country in the Denikin movement, while the mountain tribes were a wild lot, entirely incapable of self-govern-

ment. Denikin claimed the British had allowed him a new line, Kazil Burun-Rzyb River, on the Black Sea. Both Daghestan and Azarbaijan protested to the British, and a new line was established for Denikin extending from a point 5 miles south of Petrovsk to the Rzyb River. No Georgian or Azarbaijan territory was included by this new line, and only a small strip was taken from Daghestan. Denikin claimed that a port on the Black Sea (Petrovsk) was necessary as a base for his operations against Astrakhan. Denikin's forces were driven back. This new line satisfied Georgia and Azarbaijan; but it did not satisfy Denikin, who claimed that further territory was necessary to enable him to keep order along the railway and in Daghestan. The British then permitted Denikin to advance to the Azarbaijan boundary. Azarbaijan protested that this would bring Denikin dangerously near. Azarbaijan asked that Daghestan be declared a neutral zone. Denikin not only refused to withdraw but he has ordered conscription in Daghestan of all males between 19 and 42. He said that all such troops would be employed in operations against Moscow. This has greatly irritated the mountaineers of Daghestan, who under Russian rule were not required to serve. They did furnish some "savage regiments" during the war which fought very well.

The Daghestan representative at Baku is now complaining that Azarbaijan does not permit munitions to cross her frontier into Daghestan for use against Denikin. It appears that Azarbaijan is trying to pursue a very strict course on the frontier. She permits no munitions to cross into Daghestan and she interns any soldier crossing into her territory. She has also withdrawn her frontier stations so as to avoid conflict. They contemplate no aggressive action against Denikin.

The war minister of Azarbaijan complains that he desires to buy munitions for his own army, but this is not permitted by either Haskell or the British.

THE AZARBAIJAN ARMY.

Total strength, 2,500 sabers, 11,000 rifles, artillery, and 25 guns lent by Georgian Government, 30,000 armed irregulars.

Samur River, 1,200 sabers, 6,000 rifles, 16 guns.

Elisavetpol H. G., normally 1 regiment, 1,600 rifles.

Baku H. Q., 2 regiments, 3,200 rifles.

The Organization of the Army.

Infantry.—Two divisions, each containing 3 regiments, and 1 battalion of reserve. Each regiment consists of 3 battalions. Total, 20 battalions.

Cavalry.—One division, consisting of 3 regiments; in each, 4 companies. Total, 12 companies.

Artillery.—Two brigades, each 6 batteries and 1 mountain battery (mounted). Every battery has 4 guns. Total, 52 guns. Each brigade is attached to an infantry division and the mountain battery (mounted) to a cavalry division.

Sapper troops.—Separate sapper company; soon will be transferred into a sapper battalion with the representatives of all technical specialties.

Military Service.

There is used the Russian military law with several changes, caused by special local conditions. Engaged are six ages; from 19 to 24, including two-year service. Engaged are only Mohammedans.

Militia, Gendarmerie, Police, and Frontier Guard.

In Azarbaijan the militia does not exist. There are only regular troops. The gendarmerie is in the service of the ministry of the railway roads for the purpose of guarding the railway roads. The frontier guard consists of paid volunteers and has no military meaning.

FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MANDATORY.

Before approaching the subject of the military forces which the mandatory should furnish based on the foregoing estimate of the situation, it is important to point out the form which it is believed the mandatory government should take at the outset. Whatever success we have had in the past in reconstruction work in our colonial possessions has been due, probably more than anything else, to the simple and direct form of military government which we installed. It is very important in this case that we take full advantage of our past experiences and be guided accordingly. Such a government is particularly suited to the conditions we find here and the people who are to be governed. They have always been accustomed to be governed. They understand direct decision from a local authority. The fact that they have not always been well governed does not mean that the fundamental framework of their institutions are bad; the fact is that theoretically the organization of their governments and their fundamental laws are generally excellent, but bad government resulted from corrupt local officials. It is doubly important, therefore, that the personnel handling the activities of the mandatory should be of first quality. We should stick to our military government and its terminology which is now so well understood. This military government has always proven itself simple, direct, just, and productive of results in the shortest period of time. It does not become involved in a maze of complicated laws and decisions which delay action.

One of the first tasks to be accomplished is the cleaning up of the area from a sanitary standpoint. No form of government lends itself so well to such a task as our form of military government. The employment of such a government, however, does not mean we are not going to employ civil administratives from the outset wherever we find them capable and efficient, but these civil officials would be functioning under the eye of a military governor, who would have the power to remove them in the event they were inefficient or corrupt. The aim of a military government would be primarily to train a civil personnel which could gradually relieve the military. Competition might even be stimulated between Provinces in their endeavor and wish to return to complete civil administration. The comparative reports of inspections might well be published in bulletins showing progress of civil government, efficiency of local constabulary and police, and progress in schools and education.

THE MILITARY FORCES TO BE FURNISHED BY THE MANDATORY.

The strength of the army of the Black Sea on June 10, 1919, was approximately 40,000. The area of this army included Turkey in Europe, Anatolia, less the part occupied by the Egyptian command, and extending to the crest of the Caucasus Mountains. The subdivisions of this command are shown on the map which appears in Appendix F.[1] Gen. Mudge, who commands in Cilicia and whose territory extends down almost to Aleppo, has a force, he told me, of approximately 10,000, made up as follows: One brigade of Indian troops and Royal Engineers, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 French battalion, 3 battalions of Armenians (Armenian Legion).

This army of the Black Sea includes the British, French, and Italian troops, and one Greek battalion. It does not include the Greek force of five divisions, totaling 72,000, which entered Smyrna. Although all British troops, except three battalions, have been withdrawn from the Transcaucausus, we now hear that they are sending the Thirteenth Division to Batum. It will, therefore, be safe to assume that the British figured that a total of 50,000 troops was necessary for the area we are considering. This is a total of the Army of the Black Sea, plus Gen. Mudge's command of 10,000. It must be remembered that they had reserves close at hand, which could be drawn upon on short notice; that is, at Aleppo and in Allenby's command generally, and in Mesopotamia. To offset this, at least in part, it can be stated that the British entered upon the task as the result of a hard-fought war. If we came it would be in the nature of an army of occupation, which had been requested and more or less welcomed.

The total of the existing military and police force of the countries included in the area gives something of an idea of the forces which the mandatory should furnish, especially as it is the idea to have the existing regular armies pass out of existence and be replaced by a constabulary, which in turn would replace the gendarmerie. The regular forces, which it is proposed should pass out of existence, total 92,000. During the formation of the new constabulary the mandatory would have to be in a position to furnish small garrisons at a number of places where local conditions would make their presence necessary. If the Greeks are to be withdrawn from Smyrna a reinforced brigade would be needed there temporarily. In many of the villayets the gendarmerie now total 2,000. The Turkish gendarmerie totals approximately 30,000 at the present time. Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan have irregular troops, which would have to be done away with, the personnel involved returning to work in the fields or in commercial life, thereby increasing the number of producers and relieving the industrial situation. The loss of man power has been appalling, and to-day there are too many carrying a rifle, and away from work.

As for the navy, the British keep station ships at each important point and destroyers for purposes of communication.

The situation in Turkey is somewhat different from that of the Transcaucasus. In Turkey we will only need troops at strategic points, on the railways, and in addition military personnel work-

[1] Not printed.

ing on the organization and control of the newly formed constabulary. In the Transcaucasus we will use them for the same purposes, and besides it will probably be necessary to place troops in small detachments where the feeling runs high between races on the border lines, and to give security while the various nationals are being repatriated, reconstructing their homes and adjusting themselves to the new conditions. For much of this terrain cavalry would be ideal, but forage is now scarce and the war has taken off most of the horses, and these would all have to be imported.

The following troops would be necessary for the first setting of the problem:

ARMY.

	Aggregate (approximate).
For headquarters, administration services, and services of supply, 300 officers and 5,000 men	5,300
1 Infantry division (Roumelia and Anatolia), to contain a complete Cavalry regiment, Artillery brigade of 2 regiments of 75's; a third bridage added	34,000
1 Engineer regiment of 1 railway-operating battalion, 2 railway constructing battalions	3,150
1 Infantry division, made up as follows (Transcaucasus): Headquarters—1 regiment of Cavalry, 1 regiment of Engineers (3 battalions), 1 regiment 75's, 3 brigades Infantry	25,000
Extra officers and noncommissioned officers for constabulary and military government, 500 officers, 1,500 noncommissioned officers	2,000
Total	69,450

To the above must be added an efficient air service. The aeroplane can not only be greatly used as a means of communication but its value as a means for dealing promptly with a distant small problem can not be overestimated. In using it with native troops, its moral value is very great.

These troops would be employed generally as follows: The first-mentioned Infantry division, less one reenforced brigade, would be in garrison at Constantinople. It would be drawn on to handle the situation in Turkey in Europe, but it would always be in readiness to be dispatched to any point in the area of the mandate when its services might be needed. It would be in effect a small expeditionary force. One reenforced brigade would be on duty at strategic points in Anatolia and as railway guards in that same area. The railway regiment would be split between Turkey in Europe, Anatolia, and Transcaucasus, according to the demands of the railway situation.

The smaller division would be used in the Transcaucasus. The division commander could well be the military governor of the area. One reenforced brigade would then be available for each of the present subdivisions, Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan. The brigade commander in each case could well be the military governor of the subdivision. Three hundred officers and 1,000 noncommissioned officers are needed for duty with the civil government and constabulary of Anatolia. Two hundred officers and 500 noncommissioned officers are needed for this duty in Transcaucasus.

NAVY.

For headquarters of the mandatory and for each base a station ship should be provided. The following places would have to be covered in this way: Baku, Batum, Constantinople, Smyrna, Mer-

sina. The ships on this duty could be old types which are in reserve. There are some Turkish ships which with American crews installed could be used for this purpose, if necessary. (See Appendix G.)

Six destroyers would be required for communication; two colliers, one on station and one in United States or en route to this station. Oil is here in abundance. A local tanker could be used. A hospital ship could be called for from the home fleet when needed. A combined store and repair ship would also be needed. One transport of light draft and capable of carrying one complete regiment should be on station at all times. The transport, store, and repair ship could probably be combined in one. All these vessels would only need American crews in reduced strength. The nationals included within the mandate could be engaged and trained to perform much of this duty.

The entire force outlined above would have to be made up of volunteers. If the enlistment period was three years, I believe the force could be reduced one-half at the time the first volunteers' terms of enlistment were beginning to expire. A force equal to approximately one-half the estimate would then have to be maintained indefinitely. All this implies that we are left undisturbed in the area to work out the problems that confront us without interference from without.

CONSTABULARY.

The first duty of any mandatory in this region will be to provide for and guarantee internal order and the protection of the individual. Disorder has been so general that the individual has taken measures to protect himself either alone or in combination with his neighbors. No plan can be put through for the disarming of the civilian population until the individual is made to feel that he is protected by a strong central government. The external affairs of the states included within the mandate will all be taken care of by the mandatory. These included countries will, therefore, have no need for armies or navies. These should be disbanded. This will be a great relief to the budgets of the governments involved and it will go far to assist in the reorganization of their finances. A constabulary should be organized at once and be charged with maintaining internal order and police.

The administration and control of this force should be in the hands of a chief of constabulary who should be selected by the military governor general. While the actual administration and control of such a force would be largely decentralized, it should be so organized and administered as not to come under the control of local civil officials. Each big subdivision of the mandate should be organized into an inspection district. Regiments should be largely administrative units flexible in organization so as to meet the needs of the Province to which assigned, it being understood that one regiment would be assigned to each Province or its equivalent.

In Turkey the first aim should be for the organization of a constabulary of 30,000 to replace the gendarmerie. There is no gendarmerie in the Transcaucasus. At the outset the police work there would have to be performed by regular troops furnished by the mandatory. A constabulary of 6,000 should suffice for the Transcau-

casus, approximately 2,000 being allotted to each State. All organizations should be changed in station sufficiently often so as to prevent them from taking root in any district and becoming involved in local political conditions.

This whole force of constabulary would be large enough to enable the mandatory to absorb and do justice to any efficient and deserving nationals of the Governments concerned who would wish to continue in the military service.

THE INITIAL SETTING UPON UNDERTAKING THE MANDATORY.

There has been outlined above the military personnel required to handle the problem. These would be furnished by the nation accepting the mandate. At the outset the League of Nations would have to furnish the mandatory positive assistance in the way of plain acceptation of certain policies. Without this no self-respecting power should accept the task. If America should accept it, it would be entirely from a disinterested, humanitarian standpoint and we should not go in unless we are fully supported on our own conditions.

As stated before, it is believed that the peace of the world can be safeguarded better by a proper solution of the Near East problems than in any other way. Here is a chance to put the intent of the League of Nations on test before the world. Here the practical value of the league can be best demonstrated as applied to the world's greatest problem. The nation which consents to tackle the problem from a humanitarian point of view must have the policy accepted that henceforth the Near East is to be organized and administered for the best interests and development of the peoples included therein, this in contradistinction to what has happened in the past when the territory was neglected or developed as demanded to meet the world's strategic problems. If this acceptation is not made, or can not be made, then the problem can not be executed from a humanitarian point of view, and the principle of self-determination falls down under its first severe test.

The peace of the world demands the repatriation of the European Turk to Anatolia. The world should not permit the conditions which have existed at Constantinople to continue, and this area of Turkey in Europe should pass first to the mandate and years later to a status of internationalization or guaranteed neutrality. The mandatory power should be left free to move the Sultan to Anatolia. All nations now operating in the area of the mandate should be required to withdraw at once, leaving their interests in the hands of the mandatory. During the continuance of the mandate, all foreign legations should be attached directly to the mandatory and none others permitted. Foreign military attachés, military instructors, political officers, liaison officers, and foreign commissions should not be permitted, except when authorized by the mandatory power and attached to its resident representative. These terms may seem drastic, but this " world's sore " is not going to be easily cured up unless we honestly face the conditions as they exist and make our plans accordingly to tackle the problem anew in accordance with the more benevolent, honest, and just principles which are supposed to be actuating the world at the present moment. The mandatory should be left free to announce from time to time what of

the peoples included within the mandate are sufficiently civilized, cultured, and organized for self-determination or for autonomous government. Thus the mandatory would be authorized to put the civil functions of any included government in abeyance as might be necessary in the police, sanitation, reconstruction, or reorganization of the area.

The whole area under consideration has recently been involved in a World War which has greatly reduced its man power and resulted in the complete disorganization or downfall of the Governments which formerly governed the area. The temporary Governments which have grown up as a result of the war are inefficient and corrupt. In our tour of inspection throughout the area we did not see an official whom I considered fit for a leading position in any first-class Government, and no group of such officials when thoroughly questioned claimed they were fully competent or fit. It is this condition, as much as anything else, which makes the services of a mandatory absolutely necessary. But the continuance of weak Governments susceptible to bribery and intrigue will fit into the situation well if prewar conditions are to be revived throughout the area.

In view of the conditions outlined in the preceding paragraph, the mandatory should approach the problem in the form of a very strong military government. It is important that a proper setting should be given from the start. The whole responsibility should be vested in a resident military governor general selected from the army and in him should be combined the supreme command of the army and navy, with full and complete authority over any and all civil agencies engaged in the task.

The headquarters of the governor general would be Constantinople. He should so organize his office and his administration that he could spend not less than half his time inspecting and settling questions on the ground, showing himself to the people, inspecting their development and encouraging them in it. He should not be some far-off dignitary whom nobody sees and who would be administering his office entirely through subordinates, and written reports handled by interpreters and assistants.

The whole area of the mandate could then be subdivided into three areas, each with its military governor, namely, Roumelia, Anatolia, and Transcaucasia. The troops listed for that duty would be assigned to these military governors accordingly. In turn they would decentralize their problems. Thus the provincial governors in Anatolia would report to their military governor, whose headquarters might well be at Konia. In the Transcaucasus a subordinate military governor with a suitable staff would take the place of the executives of the three governments now in being in that area. Each of these governors would report to the military governor of the Transcaucasus region. No effort should be made at the outset to fix final boundary lines in this area. The people should be informed that all such lines would depend upon the peaceful development of the Provinces and States involved.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY.

While Constantinople would be, in a sense, the main base, secondary bases should be selected and equipped from the outset, so that no rehandling and transshipping would be necessary. Constanti-

nople would be the base for Roumelia, Derinje, and Smyrna for Anatolia. From these points primary distribution would be made by rail and secondary distribution by road and pack trail. In Anatolia small stores would probably have to be put into some coast towns for the supply of troops which could be better reached by sea.

Batum would be the main base for the area of the Transcaucasus, with primary distribution by the railway, the full control of which should be taken over at once by the mandatory.

As time went on natives should be employed more and more as laborers, clerks, minor officials, with a view of reducing the demands made upon the army, so as to pave the way for its reduction in strength.

SANITATION.

One of the greatest problems of a mandatory would be that involved in actually cleaning up Asia Minor. The people in the worst districts must be deloused, the filth of ages must be removed. The new generations must be educated in sanitation, both personal and public. The regulations governing such matters would have to be enforced with increasing severity. The army of the mandatory entering such a territory would be surrounded, at the outset, by the very worst conditions. The troops would have to be equipped with the most modern means of sanitation, not only sufficient for themselves but for the police of the area assigned to them. America has had wide experience in this line. She conquered Panama in this respect, cleaned up Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands in a way that had never been thought possible. In the war America maintained a higher standard of sanitation in its armies than any other allied nation. This cleaning process must start at once and proceed simultaneously with the political housecleaning.

COST.

The approximate total cost of the mandate would be as follows:

Army, yearly:	
For Turkey in Europe and Anatolia	$62,100,000
For the Transcaucasus	42,075,000
Total	104,175,000

The Naval Establishment involved would not entail any additional Federal appropriations. The ships and personnel would be withdrawn from the existing establishment and assigned to this duty. The only expense to be figured might be the difference between the cost of keeping the establishment in near eastern waters and home waters.

To offset our expenditures there would be available a part, at least, of the naval and military budget of Turkey. Before the war this totaled approximately $61,000,000, about $5,000,000 being for the navy. Some of this would be needed for pensioning off deserving naval and army personnel. While the source of revenue would be reduced due to loss of territory, this might be made up by honest handling of public funds and taxes. It is reported that before the war there was graft all along the line and only a part of the taxes reached the Turkish treasury. The gendarmerie was supported

locally in each province. This policy could be largely continued for the constabulary, or it might work for efficiency and uniformity if this tax for the constabulary was actually turned in to the central treasury and by it disbursed on a uniform basis.

It is reported that the total prewar revenues for the Transcaucasus was approximately $15,000,000, and that the average annual disbursements by Russia were $20,000,000. The mandatory would have to finance this situation until settled conditions prevailed, when the local taxes which have in the past been very light, could be increased to cover the outlay being made by the mandate. Unquestionably the whole mandate could be made self-supporting. This whole question of cost and finance is fully covered in other reports and is only touched on here very briefly.

RÉSUMÉ.

Those who in the late war had administrative experience with our allies know how very difficult any interallied control is. In the war there was only the one mission, to "defeat the enemy," but plans were often jeopardized, to say the least, by jealous interference and absence of loyal cooperation. Lord Cromer in Modern Egypt correctly states the case when he says:

> The experiment of administrative internationalism has probably been tried in the no man's land of which this history treats to a greater extent than in any other country. The result can not be said to be encouraging to those who believe in the efficacy of international action in administrative matters. What has been proved is that international institutions possess admirable negative qualities. They are formidable checks to all actions, and the reason why they are so is that, when any action is proposed, objections of one sort or another generally occur to some member of the international body. Any action often involves a presumed advantage accorded to some rival nation, and its principle of internationalism, which is scornfully rejected in theory and but too often recognized as a guide for practical action, that it is better to do nothing even though evil may ensue, than to allow good to be done at the expense of furthering the interests, or of exalting the reputation of an international rival. For all purposes of action, therefore, administrative internationalism may be said to tend toward the creation of administrative impotence. * * *
>
> The internationalism which I wish to condemn is, therefore, confined to what may be termed political internationalism; that is to say, the system which admits of the employment of political agents, who, acting under whatever instructions they may receive from their several foreign officers, are prone to introduce into the discussion of some purely local question, considerations based on the friendliness or hostility, in other parts of the world, of their countries of origin. Political passions are—or at any moment may become—too strong to allow of an international system of this latter type working smoothly.

If America, then, finds it her duty to accept a mandate in the Near East—a mandate offered to her by the powers—she should make it clear that she is doing so from a disinterested, humanitarian point of view and that her national traditions and polices are in no way affected thereby.

If the American people could witness what we have witnessed, if they could talk with the peoples who are placing all their hopes on America and realize all that word now means to thousands who are only asking to have such conditions established as to permit them to live in peace, I do not believe they would hesitate for a moment to accept the task, gigantic though it is.

No nation has ever been offered such an opportunity. No nation is so ideally equipped to accomplish it as America.

Respectfully submitted.

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Brigadier General, National Army.

APPENDIX B.

THE GENDARMERIE OF TURKEY.

1. *Conditions before the war.*—Previous to 1914 the Turkish gendarmerie, which is directly within the jurisdiction of the minister of the interior and not the minister of war, operated with commendable success in most parts of Turkey, and an excellent degree of security was assured in the districts and on the roads over which traveling was most frequent. However, owing to inferior communication, certain sections of the country were virtually in a state of isolation; there brigandage reigned and neither law nor order was known. Coupled with this is the fact that the gendarme's pay was inadequate, and he sometimes fell to the temptation of increasing his income by cooperating with these brigands so that, at times, there was no security whatsoever within the remoter districts. Generally, however, a gendarme's presence carried with it considerable security for those within his sphere of supervision, a circumstance now frequently referred to in Turk circles when comparing the lamentable conditions of the present service with that of prewar days.

Up to the time when war was declared, the officers of the gendarmerie were carefully selected from the army, and constituted really very good material. Each was graduated from a gendarmerie school in Constantinople at which he was, first of all, taught to read and write. He was enthusiastic in the prosecution of his duties—all of which were thoroughly known to him—and much of the success that crowned the operation of the gendarmerie as a public institution was due to these officers' capacity.

The noncommissioned officer of the gendarmerie was also well instructed; he, too, attended classes specially organized for his education and training, and was there taught to read and write.

The personnel of the gendarme force was composed of volunteers and an element recruited ostensibly for military service; a large per cent of this force reenlisted not oftener that twice. Before assignment to any unit, these men were given courses of instruction at regimental schools so that they also were well fitted to perform the duties of their calling.

This efficient system is the product of the enterprise of various foreign missions, and in particular to that headed by Gen. Bauman of the French Army, who was placed in charge of the Turkish Gendarmerie for a considerable lapse of time, terminating with the outbreak of the war in 1914. Under his capable direction a large personnel controlled the functioning of this department.

II. *Conditions during the armistice period.*—The advent of the war practically destroyed all the good work previously accomplished,

and with the cessation of hostilities came the realization that the gendarmerie had virtually lost all its value. Many sources of recruits ceased to exist; loss by death of many good officers and men occurred, for gendarmerie units were despatched to the front as part of the army at almost the very beginning of the war. All schools were closed and military commanders of districts appointed whomsoever they chose for the gendarme service. These appointments were made more by favor and bribery than for any ability on the part of those thus selected so that soon corrupt conditions replaced the once serviceable structure.

The great size of Turkey and the poor service of communication throughout the interior made civil government therein impossible of enforcement and abuses such as deportations, pillaging, bribery, etc., became alarmingly abundant, in which disorders the poorly paid, underfed and disgruntled gendarme participated energetically with a view to bettering his meager share.

III. *Recent organization.*—The recent organization of the Turkish Gendarmerie provided for what is termed a "commandement general" which, although established at Constantinople, is represented throughout the Turkish Empire by subunits called "inspection districts."

The commandement general, at the head of which is the chief of the gendarmerie (called the commandant general), is actually the base on which the other elements of the gendarme structure rest. The functions of these headquarters are to set the principles and decide the practices of the service throughout the country. The commandement general is itself subdivided into three distinct groups, each of which is under the supervision of a colonel: Group I concerns itself in matters pertaining to operations; Group II concerns itself in matters dealing with the personnel; Group III concerns itself in matters relevant to administration.

The subunits of the gendarmerie are the regiment, battalion, company, section, and karakols (a group of from 6 to 12 men), each of which body functions within a specified administrative division of the country; for example: A Vilayet is policed by one regiment in command of a lieutenant colonel; a sandjak is policed by one battalion in command of a major; a caza is policed by one company in command of a captain.

A section is commanded by a first or second lieutenant, and a karakola—which is a small force used at a gendarme post—is commanded by a noncommissioned officer. Certain battalions of the gendarmerie are identified as "independent battalions," for purposes of administration within independent political division of the country. Several regiments or independent battalions under the command of a colonel (see Table No. 1) constitute an inspection district.

Lack of funds placed the gendarmerie in a very inferior position materially. The remuneration was entirely too inadequate to meet essential obligations (see Table No. 2 for past and present rates of pay), and little clothing was available; barracks were in a dilapidated condition and devoid of beds. Likewise, the equipment was very poor and for those supposed to be mounted, horses were not available.

In the matter of personnel much was left to be desired. Surviving officers of the prewar establishments were retaken into the service, but they, for diverse reasons, lost their former worth and became for the most part unscrupulous and dishonest characters. To this assortment must be added an inefficient element of army officers who were gathered promiscuously, and consequently knew nothing of their duties as gendarme agents. Even in the ranks of the service were found unsatisfactory men drawn from the army to complete their terms of service as military police.

IV. (*a*) *Mission for the reorganization of Turkish gendarmerie.*—With the full approval of the allied Governments, a mission was organized, comprising Gen. Foulon of the French Army, 12 other French officers, and 2 Italians as his assistants, to reconstruct the Turkish gendarmerie. The British were invited to help in this task, but for one reason or another did not accept. Gen. Foulon, inspector general and chief of this mission, has spent considerable time in the Orient and has a thorough knowledge of the Turkish language. He is considered very well qualified to handle this difficult rôle with credit.

Confronted by the aforementioned corrupt conditions, the Foulon mission has decided to adopt the following measures:

1. To incorporate a new order of regulations modeled along the French system.
2. To provide the highest possible grade of personnel by judicious selection and recruitings.
3. To reestablish training schools.
4. To provide a foreign personnel capable of inculcating efficient administration and government.

Already in the important cities of Constantinople, Brousa, Smyrna, Angora, Sivas, Samsun, and Trebizond reorganizing officers of the Foulon mission are at work eliminating, little by little, the bad element and replacing this with worthy and capable officers and men. By a strict surveillance much of the abuse heretofore suffered by the defenseless people has been eliminated and constant progress is regularly reported.

Officers and men who have proven their capabilities will henceforth have the positions to which they are assigned in the gendarmerie guaranteed. Without written authority from the office of the chief of the mission no active member of the service shall be removed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Each of the personnel has filed under his name a dossier, in which the usual entries are made, and from time to time this record is examined by a board of Turkish officers to determine the fitness of that person.

Many schools have been reopened, including that for officers at Constantinople, to which over 60 men have reported only recently.

The pay, too, of the gendarme has been improved, thanks to the efforts of Gen. Foulon, who, in this respect, has experienced considerable difficulty by reason of the wretched financial situation now prevalent in Turkey.

A depot for clothes, which has up to recently been practically empty, is now well supplied with various assortments of garments from which shipments have already been made to the interior, so that for the coming winter each gendarme will be supplied a new uniform, shoes, etc.

The gendarme is in no way associated with the local police; he is obliged to be in uniform when on duty and must never function in any secret service or plain clothes capacity. He operates more particularly along country roads and isolated districts; in any event, as little as possible about the vicinity of his home. The normal term of enlistment of the gendarme is three years; however, under certain circumstances one may agree to serve for one year only.

V. *Historical.*—The five officers of each of the great powers (France, England, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia), detailed for duty in the Turkish Empire, arrived at Saloniki the end of April, 1904. At about the same time one German, several Belgian and Swedish officers were also dispatched, and in 1905 each of these countries increased the number of its representatives by from 5 to 11.

With the revolution of 1909 the Russian and Austro-Hungarian officers returned to their respective capitals and by the time the reorganization program had reached its limit of development, the number of foreign officers was reduced to a total of 25, among whom were French, Italians, British, and one German. Then, with the Tripolian War, the Italians withdrew and subsequently there remained only the French mission headed by Gen. Bauman, his 15 French Army officers, and the British. The French general contemplated increasing the members of his staff to 50 when the war, 1914–1918, necessitated his and the British representatives' withdrawal.

Prepared and submitted by

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TABLE NO. 1.—*Strength of the Turkish gendarmerie.*

Inspection district.	Regiment.	Independent battalion.	Authorized strength.		Actual strength.	
			Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Gendarmes.
Constantinople	Constantinople		63	2,000	63	1,238
Do	Adrianople		78	1,604	78	1,415
Do	Broussa		52	1,239	59	1,151
Do	Ismid		30	720	29	751
Do		Tchataldja	10	173	9	233
Do		Bolou	22	600	18	578
Total			255	6,336	256	5,366
Smyrna	Smyrna		131	2,627	82	[1] 1,500
Do	Carassi		25	950	36	845
Do		Dardanelles	15	550	17	539
Do		Kutahia	15	380	13	375
Do		Kara-Hissar	14	360	13	397
Do		Menteche	22	847	18	412
Total			222	5,714	179	4,068
Angora	Angora		65	1,100	51	1,079
Do	Castamouni		60	900	44	880
Do		Eski-Chehir	16	325	13	312
Total			141	2,325	108	2,271

[1] Approximate.

TABLE No. 1.—*Strength of the Turkish gendarmerie*—Continued.

Inspection district.	Regiment.	Independent battalion.	Authorized strength.		Actual strength.	
			Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Gendarmes.
Konia	Konia		53	852	44	1,352
Do		Anatolia	21	417	14	411
Do		Cesaria	17	301	14	337
Do		Nighde	15	283	13	283
Total			106	1,853	85	2,383
Adana	Adana		34	2,624	75	2,453
Do		Itch-Il	13	332	9	305
Do		Marache	17	476	9	495
Do		Aintab	12	880	10	499
Do		Ourfa	16	1,020	15	541
Total			92	5,322	118	4,293
Trebizond	Trebizond		87	1,383	59	1,348
Do	Erzerum		69	1,096	49	1,072
Do		Erzinjan	17	780	15	503
Total			173	3,259	123	2,923
Sivas	Sivas		100	1,932	57	1,591
Do	Mamouret-ul-Aziz		76	1,273	49	1,404
Do		Djanik	20	500	22	717
Total			196	3,705	128	3,712
Bitlis	Bitlis		60	1,552	34	831
Do	Diarbekir		68	1,571	52	1,573
Do	Van		58	1,605	31	386
Total			186	4,728	117	2,790
Grand total			1,371	33,242	1,114	27,806

OCTOBER 13, 1919.

TABLE No. 2.—*Monthly pay.*

Grades.	End of 1918.	Present pay.	Proposed pay.
	Piasters.	*Piasters.*	*Piasters.*
Commander general	10,110	14,160	16,350
Adjutant of commander general	.....	8,460	11,450
Regiment commander	4,485	6,800	8,923
Battalion commander	2,860	4,774	7,225
Senior captain	1,922	4,123	5,270
Captain	1,610	3,612	4,970
First lieutenant	1,297	3,100	4,440
Second lieutenant	1,172	2,760	4,240
Cadet	688	1,796	3,360
Idare muduri (director administrative)	2,860	4,774	.....
Idare emini (director general)	2,110	4,293	6,925
Idare muavin (aid)	1,735	3,612	4,970
Tabour kiatibi (regiment secretary)	1,485	3,100	4,670
Imam (priest)	1,235	2,519	.....
Tabour muavi (assistant)	860	2,278	3,560
Armurier (sword cutler)	1,110	2,278	.....
Beuluk kiatibi (secretary of battalion:			
Married	547	1,650	.....
Bachelor	.....	1,150	.....
Sergeant major:			
Married	300	1,650	.....
Bachelor	.....	1,150	.....
Sergeant:			
Married	275	1,600	.....
Bachelor	.....	1,100	.....
Corporal:			
Married	262	1,550	.....
Bachelor	.....	1,000	.....
Mounted sergeant major (bachelor)	337	.....	.....
Sergeant, mounted (bachelor)	312	.....	.....
Mounted corporal (bachelor)	300	.....	.....
Mounted gendarme (bachelor)	287	.....	.....

TABLE No. 3.

Inspection district.	Regiment.	Independent battalion.	Battalions.	Companies.	Independent sections.
Constantinople	Constantinople		3	11	4
Do	Adrianople		4	13	12
Do	Brusa		2	9	3
Do	Ismid		1	5	3
Do		Tchataldja	1	1	2
Do		Boulou	1	5	4
Total			12	44	28
Smyrna	Smyrna		5	24	16
Do	Carassi		1	6	5
Do		Dardanelles	1	2	4
Do		Kutahia	1	3	1
Do		Af. Kara Hissar	1	3	3
Do		Menteche	1	6	
Total			10	44	29
Angora	Angora		4	10	6
Do	Castamouni		3	11	3
Do		Eskichehir	1	3	2
Total			8	24	11
Konia	Konia		2	9	10
Do		Anatalia	1	3	5
Do		Cesaria	1	3	1
Do		Nighde	1	2	5
Total			5	17	21
Adana	Adana		2	7	
Do		Idjil	1	2	1
Do		Marache	1	4	
Do		Aintab	1	3	
Do		Ourfa	1	3	
Total			6	19	1
Trebizond	Trebizond		4	16	3
Do	Erzerum		2	13	3
Do		Erzinjan	1	4	
Total			7	33	6
Sivas	Sivas		4	20	
Do	Mamouret el Aziz		3	16	
Do		Djanik	1	4	2
Total			8	40	2
Bitlis	Bitlis		4	12	1
Do	Diarbekir		4	10	4
Do	Van		3	8	1
Total			11	30	6
Grand total			67	251	104

Appendix C.

Statistics showing the fighting strength, number of mouths, horses, mules, and other animals and also of arms and war supplies in the Armenian Army on Sept. 26, 1919.

Names of units.	Men.		Animals.				With pistols.	Guns.	
	Bayonets.	Mouths.	Horses.	Mules.	Oxen.	Camels.		Field.	Mountain.
Kars detachment	2,931	4,573	228	67	422	3	4	4	6
Karakliss detachment	1,800	2,370	102	.....	17	.....	.....	.....	2
Alexandropol detachment	783	1,396	147	33	8	.....	.....	.....	2
Kars sentry battalion	389	482	5	.....	8	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kars fortress artillery	.....	362	3	.....	24	.....	32	.....	.....
Office of military chief	.....	15	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Aviation detachment	.....	49	3	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Independent infantry board brigade headquarters (fourth)	.....	140	13	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seventh infantry regiment	795	944	17	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	4
Kamarlu detachment	1,583	2,306	142	73	100	.....	3	.....	4
Echmiadrin detachment	50	75	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tgdir detachment	1,871	2,789	381	114	.....	.....	.....	4	4
Noxobaiaset detachment	1,105	1,395	95	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	2
Daralagor detachment	1,204	1,365	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Erivan garrison	1,059	3,198	161	133	.....	.....	4	6	10
Total	13,570	21,459	1,299	421	579	3	45	14	30

Names of units.	Machine guns.			Rifles.					Swords.	Poinards.
	Colt.	Maxim.	Lewis.	3-inch Russian.	Lebel.	Berdan.	Carabine.	Other makes.		
Kars detachment	13	11	39	4,266	.....	5	.....	.....	.....	.....
Karakliss detachment	.....	8	7	2,105	210	120	10	50	.....	.....
Alexandropol detachment	.....	5	5	736	2	443	.....	15	6	20
Kars sentry battalion	.....	.....	1	364	.....	373	.....	2	.....	.....
Kars fortress artillery	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	100	.....	.....	.....	.....
Aviation detachment	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	20	.....	.....	.....	.....
Independent infantry board brigade headquarters (fourth)	.....	.....	.....	47	16	.....	.....	2	.....	.....
Seventh infantry regiment	10	.....	.....	629	21	6	.....	22	2	.....
Kamarlu detachment	5	17	2	634	817	36	.....	.....	28	.....
Echmiadrin detachment	.....	.....	.....	84	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tgdir detachment	5	4	12	1,109	805	.....	.....	400	.....	.....
Noxobaiaset detachment	2	.....	5	685	83	83	.....	93	.....	.....
Daralagor detachment	3	6	6	900	200	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Erivan garrison	8	.....	.....	1,579	9	32	5	9	23	8
Total	46	51	77	13,138	2,163	1,218	15	593	59	28

Statistics showing the fighting strength, etc.—Continued.

Names of units.	Shells.				Cartridges.					
	Shrapnel.	Grenade.	Mountain.	Light.	Russian.	Lebel.	Lewis.	Berdan.	Turkish.	Other makes.
Kars detachment	954	.....	1,390	948	183,637	.....	225,080	.....	.....	36,731
Karakliss detachment	.....	.....	280	.....	50,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Alexandropol detachment	.....	.....	280	.....	36,337	12,540	27,720	3,850	.....	.....
Kars sentry battalion	.....	.....	.....	.....	38,000	11,000	7,000	50,800	.....	.....
Independent infantry board brigade headquarters (fourth)	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,555	800	.....	.....	.....	157
Seventh infantry regiment	160	160	.....	.....	77,500	1,300	3,933	1,000	.....	6,370
Kamarlu detachment	.....	400	.....	.....	136,160	184,491	86,800	587	.....	.....
Echmiadrin detachment	.....	.....	.....	.....	25,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tgdir detachment	.....	420	592	.....	143,000	260,000	.....	.....	37,500	.....
Noxobaiaset detachment	.....	.....	805	.....	28,400	56,315	.....	850	63,860	.....
Daralagor detachment	.....	.....	.....	.....	80,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Erivan garrison	96	100	.....	.....	34,730	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total	1,210	1,080	3,347	948	834,319	526,446	350,533	57,087	101,360	43,258

Appendix D.

INFORMATION ON THE QUESTIONS (1) WHO SERVES IN THE TROOPS OF THE ARMENIAN REPUBLIC? (2) WHETHER RECRUITING EXISTS; AND IF SO, UPON WHAT BASIS?

1. Though from the very beginning of the Great War there already existed some Armenian units, the real development and formation of these units began with the evacuation of the Caucasian front by the Russian Army in 1918. To replace the troops which were going away the nations of Transcaucasia began in earnest to form their national units, Armenian units included. The material for the formation of these units consisted principally of disbanded units, together with some volunteers and some classes of raw recruits called in accordance with the national council's decision. The national principle adopted in the beginning of formation remained the same until the present time, with the exception that in the effective force of the Army and also in the administration and institutions of the military department there is a certain per cent of officers, physicians, and ranks from the Russians, who desired to continue voluntarily in the service in Armenia.

In view of the indefiniteness of the boundaries of Armenia and of the absence of the law concerning the question of military recruiting of citizens of other nationalities remained open, and in the meantime it was taken for a basis that this recruitment must be executed by all the Armenians living on the territory of the Armenian Republic.

2. Military recruiting exists in Armenia, and as regards this recruiting Armenia follows the Russian martial law and other legislation used in this respect in Russia.

Nevertheless, the contemporary political activity and the extreme effort of the country in defending with arms in hands its existence does not permit to pass to the peaceable situation and keeps the country on a war footing. Thus, in spite of the Government law of July 1, by which the term of military service was fixed at 18 years

(3 years' active service and 15 years' reserve), the present threatening attitude makes it necessary not only to keep in active military service five ages of conscripts (from 20 to 25 years) but also to call five additional ages of the reserve; that is, up to 30 years, and officers up to 40 years of age.

The enormous demand for complements for the existing and the newly formed units on the one side, and the scarcity of reserve soldiers for the requirements of the army on the other side, makes necessary a reduction to the minimum of the number of exemptions from service, especially—

(*a*) In each family the provider is exempt in the absence of other members capable of labor.

(*b*) Scholars of the superior schools upon reaching the age of 20 are immediately subject to military service, and pupils of the middle schools after having finished their studies.

(*c*) The officers of all categories, being in reserve, are called into service in necessary numbers, according to the judgment of the war minister and by his direction.

(*d*) No members of any other departments are exempt from service, with the exception of those persons who at the time are serving in postal telegraph institutions (except watchmen and errant-porters), militia, customhouses, commissaries of districts, and sections with their helpers, judges, procurators, and coroners.

The law of the Armenian Parliament of September 9 provides that persons called into military service from their employments in the Government service and with private concerns shall retain their positions and wages, and the families of the reservists and warriors accepted for military service shall receive pecuniary relief.

MAKKAVEEF, *Colonel.*

APPENDIX E.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA.

As is generally known, the inhabitants of the Republic of Georgia are descendants of the oldest civilized race of mankind. In ancient history they are known under the name of Chaldeans, who inhabited the area of Babylon. During its entire history, covering a period of 3,000 years, the Georgians have been continually engaged in warfare with the uncivilized and savage races surrounding her on every side. After Christ, the Georgians always struggled against the enemies of the Gospel. For this reason the various nations of Asia Minor consider Georgia as a warrior, continually fighting for the highest ideals of mankind. A study of the sayings and songs of the surrounding nations fully convince us of that.

In accordance with the treaty between Russia and Georgia, the latter remained a sovereign State and had a separate army, but nullifiction by degrees of the independence of Georgia and the ramification of the population followed the disbanding of the Georgian Army. The old Russian Government, however, realizing the value of the Georgian as a warrior, retained special Georgian regiments as part of the Russian Army until the end of the nineteenth century.

This was due to the fact that during the Russian wars in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century the Georgians distinguished themselves as very good soldiers. Thus the Georgians were very much offended when, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the existence of the Georgian regiments came to an end. Since that time the young men of Georgia have been sent for military service to Siberia, Archangel, and Poland. Unaccustomed to the severe climate in these countries, a good many of them died, and those who did return to their homes were for the most part ill with consumption.

During the late war with Germany the Republic of Georgia contributed to the Russian Army over 160,000 men and 5,000 officers. It is worthy of mention that the percentage of Georgians decorated for bravery and those killed and wounded during the Great War is much higher than that of any other nation in the Russian Empire, not excluding the Russians themselves.

As soon as it became evident in the latter part of 1917 that the Russian Army would be disorganized and that the Georgians would be left to their own destiny in the uneven struggle with Turkey, the Georgians proceeded to organize a national army corps. Conditions were very bad; bolshevism was gaining on all sides; the country was threatened with anarchy; Russian bolshevists running away from the front threatened to invade the whole country; and Georgian soldiers themselves, returning rmo Russian bolshevist regiments, could not be used as defenders of their own country. In spite of these difficulties a force of about 30,000 men was organized to fight against Turkey, but unfortunately they had no war materials. There were only 10,000 rifles available, for prior to this everything had been sent from the Tiflis depot to the front, and therefore had fallen into the hands of the Turks or had been taken by the Russian bolshevist soldiers. In spite of these bad conditions the Georgian troops, together with the so-called national guard, endeavored to defend Batum. They fought successfully at the river Cholox, under Osourguety, in Axhaltsykt and Borchels Provinces. The inability of the Georgians to secure help from the Allies compelled Georgia to seek other means for saving the physical existence of her people.

In 1918, with the Great War still in progress and fighting might still be expected in the Trans-Caucasus, the Georgians organized an army consisting of two infantry divisions, with an artillery, a frontier brigade, a cavalry brigade, an army artillery brigade and engineers; almost all of them numbered as in war time, the army totaling 2,000 officers and 39,000 men. During this year, with the Great War ended and the hope strong that the League of Nations and the Paris peace conference will not permit any more blood to be shed, the Georgian Constituent Assembly passed a new law concerning the organization of armed forces in the State. According to this law the armed forces of the Republic consist of an army and national guard. On a peace-time basis the army consists of about 900 officers and 14,000 men. It is composed of 3 infantry brigades with artillery, frontier troops, Tiflis guard battalion, cavalry regiment, army artillery division, battalion of sappers, motor-car company, company of aviators, wireless company.

An infantry brigade consists of four infantry battalions and one artillery division. One battalion consists of five companies, one machine-gun company, and several platoons of telephonists, scouts, etc. An artillery division consists of 3 batteries. A cavalry regiment has three squadrons and one machine-gun squadron. Frontier troops have six frontier detachments. A battalion of sappers has two companies of sappers and two companies of telegraphists. A motor-car company has three motor-cars and one armored motor-car platoon. An aviation school for the company of aviators. A wireless company has two constant and two field wireless stations. The men serve in the infantry 16 months, and in special troops 20 months.

The highest command in peace time belong to the war minister, who has an assistant general. In time of war all the troops are under the command of a commander in chief, who is appointed by a special decree of the Government.

The chief of the general staff is the chief of staff of the army in peace time as well as in war.

There is a military school to prepare officers for the army, and attached to this school is a corporal's battalion for training corporals for the whole army.

In the war office there is a special section looking after the mental training of soldiers in the army. Every soldier is taught to read and write.

In war time according to our plans we may put into the field an army of about 200,000 men. In the Great War Georgia has given to the Russian army 160,000 soldiers.

The national guard being quite a national organization was formed in the latter part of 1917, and together with the army rendered great service to the country. The national guard is composed of reliable volunteers, who are not obliged to serve in the army, and it is as successfully used against the enemy as it is for the maintenance of order in the country. Usually it consists of one infantry brigade, but if necessary it may be mobilized by the order of the prime minister of the republic. The things required for the army are numerous. It has already been stated above that on account of the lack of equipment in the early part of 1918 we could not continue our struggle against Turkey. At the present time the need of essential equipment is still greater. We are in need of rifles, guns, and ammunition, and we want them of the Russian pattern, as we have already Russian rifles, etc., and our own soldiers are used to them. We want also technical things, equipment, clothing, boots, and bread for the army.

All the details will be forwarded if the question of satisfying our requirements will be settled in a positive way.

N. Ramishvili,
Minister of War.

Appendix G.

AMENDMENTS TO THE TURKISH ARMISTICE.

There are three flag officers on the active list of whom two only are at present employed. The names of all three are shown in order of seniority; also the chief of the naval staff.

Name of command.	Flagship.	Name and rank.	(1) Seniority, (2) date of appointment.	G. O. S.
All commissioned vessels.	Tourgut Reis.....	Rear Admiral Arif Pasha.	(1) 7/10/17..... (2) 16/ 8/14.....	Nil.
		Rear Admiral Vassif Pasha.	(1) 7/10/17..... (2) 19/ 2/19.....	Do.
Commodore imperial yachts (2).	Imperial yacht Ertogul.	Rear Admiral Ibrahim Pasha.	(1) 6/10/18..... (2) 12/ 3/16.....	Do.

TURKEY.

The Turkish Navy is interned under allied supervision in accordance with article 6 of the armistice with Turkey dated October 30, 1918.

Imperial Ottoman Navy—Nominal list of all vessels.

[Figures in parentheses after each name is displacement in tons. Unless otherwise stated all are at Constantinople.]

Battleship, Toorgood Reis, ex Weissenburg (9,901).
Battle cruiser, Yavouz Sultan Selim, ex Goeben (23,000), at Ismid.
Light cruisers:
- Hamidieh (3,805).
- Medjidieh (3,250).

Torpedo gunboats:
- Berg-I-Satvet (775).
- Perik-I-Shevket (775).

Torpedo-boat destroyers:
- Muavanet-I-Millet (616).
- Noumoune-I-Hamiyet (616).
- Bassra (300).
- Samsoun (300).
- Tashoz (300).

Torpedo boats:
- Berk-Efshan (270).
- Sivri Hissar (98).
- Sultan Hissar (98).
- Ack Hissar (145).
- Drach (160).
- Moussoul (160).
- Younnous (160).

Motor launches (600 feet Thorneycroft):
- At Constantinople, Nos. 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
- At Smyrna, No. 14.
- Lost during the war, Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 16.
- Lost during Italian war, Nos. 9, 10.
- Not received from contractors, Nos. 3, 4, 22.

Submarines, none.
Sloops and gunboats:
- Aiden Reis (510), Trebizond, police duties.

Sloops and gunboats—Continued.
- Burrack Reis (510).
- Prevesah (510), Sinope, police duties.
- Sakiz (510).
- Kemal, ex Durack Reis (420).
- Hizir Reis (520), Smyrna, police duties.
- Issa Reis (420).
- Malatia (210), seriously damaged by mine.
- Zuhaf (650), surveying ship, at Ismid.
- Barik-I-Zaffer (198).

Mining vessels:
- Intibah (616), 60 mines on deck.
- Nusrat (360), 25 mines, in Ægean Sea with mine-clearance force.

Transports:
- Rechid Pasha (4,426).
- Kiresund (3,056 gross), mine depot.
- Ourla (4,171 gross), no rudder or propeller.
- Tir-I-Mujghian (3,936), training ship.

Yachts:
- Stamboul (910), paddle.
- Izzedin (1,075), paddle.
- Galata (140), screw.
- Ertougal (900), screw.
- Sugutli (110), screw.

Armored vessels:
- Idjlalieh (2,266), training ship.
- Muin-I-Zaffer (2,400), training ship.
- Nedjmi Shevket (2,080), depot ship.

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